Tuesday, March 17, 2020
I recently mentioned discussions about “parental alienation” (PA) on the World Health Organization website, where there is ongoing discussion of the 11th edition of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11). PA advocates would like to include PA as an index term—a term that can be found in the index, but in this case that leads the reader to a much more general classification. People concerned about the potential harm of PA “diagnoses” and treatments have opposed this.
If you are interested in this discussion you can go to the WHO website and set up an account that lets you read and comment on proposals.
I have just commented on one statement there, and I want to elaborate here on what I said. On the WHO website, a PA advocate cited a paper I published in Journal of Child Custody, in which I said that the outcome research on PA treatments was at no better than a “promising” level. The advocate used this statement to assert that I had said PA treatments were promising and therefore ICD-11 should include PA.
Unfortunately, this PA advocate apparently does not understand that a “promising” treatment is not in fact particularly promising, in the everyday sense of that term. The “promising” category is one that has real meaning for people who do and use outcome research in psychology, but its name is deceptive for others. This is a nuisance but I am not sure what we can do about it now—except to educate people.
Research on the effectiveness of psychotherapies can be evaluated as being at one of five levels of evidence. These levels are essentially measures of the quality of the research and the extent to which confidence can be placed in its results. The two highest levels of evidence, randomized controlled trials and clinical controlled trials, are not identical but share some important features. The crucial feature is that each method builds in standards of comparison, so that the results of a treatment are compared to the results shown in other circumstances, which may be no treatment at all, established treatments, sham treatments (placebo conditions), etc. Because treatments may—indeed are supposed to—have long-term effects, and for other reasons as well, these two high-quality methods compare people receiving the treatment to other, similar people who receive the control/comparison condition. Using such comparisons is especially important in work with children and adolescents, who are developing rapidly and whose natural changes may easily be mistaken for the effects of a treatment.
When research at those two high levels of evidence shows positive effects of a treatment, and when those effects are confirmed by independent researchers, the treatment can properly be called evidence-based. “Promising” research is work that has been designed and carried out at a lower level of evidence, for example a simple before and after comparison of a group of people, prior to and following their treatment. The “promising” nature of a treatment that shows positive results under those circumstances is that it is worth doing more complex research on the treatment, although there are no guarantees that the treatment will be shown to be effective with more challenging designs.
PA treatments are “promising” because positive effects have been reported when parents’ views of children’s attitudes after a treatment have been compared to their views before a treatment. As there is no standardized way to evaluate a child’s PA as present or absent, much less to quantify it, there have been no comparisons of the children’s attitudes themselves before and after treatment. And there certainly are no published studies reporting randomized controlled trials or clinical controlled trials of PA treatments, using controls which are essential for work on treatments for quickly-changing children and adolescents. These facts are among the many reasons why ICD-11 will not contain PA as a disorder.
When you see that a treatment is “promising”, be sure to consider exactly what is being promised!
Wednesday, March 11, 2020
Readers who are aware of the fight against accusations of “parental alienation” (PA) probably know that some years ago PA advocates were bitterly disappointed when the notional Parental Alienation Syndrome (PAS) was not included in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association (DSM-5). Although PA proponents already experience much success in family courts, where they argue that avoidance of one parent by children of divorced couples is likely to be due to “alienating” behavior by the preferred parent, and that the remedy is to force the children to live with the rejected parent and undergo proprietary treatments, the PA advocates would enjoy many advantages if PAS were listed in DSM. Such listing would provide the diagnostic code that is the magic word for access to health insurance coverage.
Exclusion from DSM-5 was not enough to convince PA advocates that they are far outside the mainstream of psychology with their claims about PA. They went on to attempt some level of inclusion in the forthcoming ICD-11, the World Health Organization’s International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, WHO’s list of diagnoses for both physical and mental disorders. Although PAS was known not to be included as an ICD-11 diagnosis, PA proponents were agitating to include PA as an “index term”—that is, it would be listed in the ICD-11 index but take the reader to another diagnostic term. As often as WHO said that inclusion of an index term was not an indication of acceptance of the diagnosis, nevertheless it was clear that PA advocates were claiming victory for their views even if PA appeared only as an index term.
An international group of concerned professionals has been fighting the PA index term inclusion, and has been successful. The link below will tell you the story—which has a good outcome not only because of the number of people who engaged in this fight but because of a few people who used personal contacts effectively and devoted much time to the endeavor:
PA websites that come up first on search engines still claim that ICD-11 is indexing PA. It is not! If you are engaged in a divorce and PA claims are being made, be sure your attorney knows this fact. Letting PA advocates get away with various claims is a sure way for innocent parents to find themselves separated from their children by court order, paying huge sums for “treatment”, and being embroiled in court-ordered "treatment” for themselves at the risk of being found in contempt and punished with fines or even a jail sentence.
Friday, March 6, 2020
A number of publications in professional journals in the last few years have argued strongly against the idea of parental alienation (PA)-- the belief that when a child of divorced parents avoids contact with one parent, the reason is likely to be that the preferred parent has “brainwashed” the child into this negative attitude. Journal articles have pointed out that PA advocates have given no acceptable scientific evidence to support their views, and in addition the treatments advised by PA proponents may be not only ineffective but harmful.
Because of this lack of supportive evidence, PA advocates were unable to get their claimed “syndrome” listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association when a new edition was published in 2013. The goal of inclusion in DSM-5 was an important one for PA proponents because this would be the key to payment for PA treatments by health insurance companies, who require a DSM code diagnosis.
It seems as if PA advocates and practitioners of PA treatments should recognize that they have been called out, but they are continuing to fight, and the money and power associated with bringing the PA concept into the courtroom are no doubt good enough reasons to do this. There are two fronts on which PA-related conflicts are intense right now.
One area of conflict is the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) produced by the Workd Health Organization. ICD includes both mental and physical disease and provides codes as DSM does, though DSM does this for mental illness only. The eleventh edition of ICD is in preparation. ICD-11 will not include PA as a diagnosis—there is no argument about that. There is, however, conflict over the proposed conclusion of PA as an index term. That means that a person could look up PA in the ICD-11 index, find it, and be directed to a page discussing child-parent relationship problems. This is legitimately seen by opponents of PA beliefs as the camel’s nose under the tent, with indexing of the term suggesting that there is a meaningful concept there, possibly to be followed by a later acceptance of PA as an ICD diagnosis. Comments have proliferated on the WHO website, with most of them arguing that PA should be included. An interesting comment recently was a masterpiece of irrelevant conclusion, arguing in favor of the inclusion of Craig Childress’s views and comparing statements about the lack of evidence for PA to climate science denial (apparently the fact that some denials are incorrect is taken as proof that this, and maybe all, denials must also be incorrect). Interested readers can find this material on the WHO website and can set up an account to read it.
A second area of conflict for PA opponents and proponents has to do with the demonstrated association between allegations of PA against one parent and domestic violence or child abuse by the other parent. It appears that women who charge their husbands with DV or abuse are more likely to have it alleged that they, the women, are interfering with the fathers’ relationships with their children and thus causing PA. This has come to the point where women may be afraid to state that they or their children have been abused because this statement may be taken as evidence that they are “brainwashing” the children and that they are irrationally hostile toward their husbands. In family courts, these arguments may well result in court orders prohibiting a mother to have contact with a child, making complete custody change to the father, and sending the child to a parental alienation treatment at the mother’s expense. Once these events have occurred, the possibility that the mother will regain contact (much less custody) diminish in a number of ways that would be familiar to Franz Kafka.
One belief behind this series of events is that family courts are biased against men and therefore, in all fairness, and to right this wrong, men’s claims and wishes should be given extra consideration. This idea appears to be a myth, and thus any effort to put a judicial thumb on the father’s side of the scale is going to create bias against mothers. The Guardian discusses this issue here: https://www.theguardian.com/society/commentisfree/2020/mar/05/family-courts-biased-men-dangerous-fallacy-abuse Biased outcomes are undesirable in all cases, but they are actually dangerous if they lead to custody of children being given to abusers.
The argument thus goes on, but it seems to me that only the anti-PA side is paying any attention to the facts about outcomes.
Thursday, March 5, 2020
According to an article in the Washington Post (https://www.washingtonpost.com/2020/03/05/electric-shock-fda-ban), the U.S. Food and Drug Administration has after at least six years of consideration decided to ban a device that delivers electric shocks to children and adolescents. The shock is given with the intention of stopping dangerous or undesirable behavior and helping children learn not to do the unwanted things. Although the use of electric shocks as aversive treatments was not uncommon several decades ago, such methods have been used less and less as they have been shown to have potential dangers like skin burns and in addition to create so much distress that little learning may take place.
In fact, there is only one place in the United States that has continued to use aversive shocks regularly for behavior management. That is the Judge Rotenberg Center in Massachusetts, which will be uniquely affected by the FDA ban and plans to appeal the ruling in court. Judge Rotenberg staff claim that aversive shock use is lifesaving for some children.
There are a few circumstances where aversives, if effective, can prevent even worse outcomes than they risk. For example, some genetic syndromes drive their victims to mutilate themselves, even gouging out their own eyes and pulling out teeth. A skin burn seems a small price to pay for keeping one’s eyes in place.
Unfortunately, the effective use of aversives is not a simple matter. Ideally, a shock or other aversive should begin as the patient starts a concerning behavior. The longer the time that passes between the behavior and the aversive, the less effective the aversive will be—but adverse side effects like burns or general fearfulness will still be present. Staff must be carefully trained and supervised to make sure that aversives are used correctly if used at all.
Staff problems are exactly how FDA attention was drawn to Judge Rotenberg. Not only did staff members fail to use aversive shock correctly some years ago, but they were reported to have used it in a totally arbitrary and even sadistic way. One staff member telephoned in the night to a colleague on duty, pretended to be an administrator, and told the colleague to wake up a boy and to give him a large number of shocks. The on-duty staff member did as he was told, against every principle on which use of aversives is normally founded. There was no unwanted behavior to try to stop or prevent, as the boy was sleeping, and the number of shocks was far beyond the usual practice. That the off-duty staff member thought this trick was clever or funny and ignored the impact on the patient is almost unbelievable, but that’s what seems to have happened. I have to question whether any level of training could correct this attitude, or the readiness of the on-duty staff to comply, but surely careful supervision could have prevented this incident from occurring.
It is far from clear what is currently happening at Judge Rotenberg with respect to the use of aversive shocks. It appears that the center wants to continue use as in the past. The FDA gives the center 180 days to retool and transition from the use of the shock device to other methods. A possible change might be to the use of unpleasant sounds as aversives, a method that is safe and has been reported to be as effective as shocks. Even if this were accomplished, however, abolishing shock use may be only one step toward safe and effective use of aversives, which if applied capriciously can create anxiety that interferes with good functioning. (What if you were awakened from a sound sleep by repeated loud, unpleasant sounds that you could not escape or avoid?) Training and supervision are keys to appropriate use of aversives, and I hope this point will be thoroughly discussed as the Judge Rotenberg Center challenges the FDA decision.
Monday, February 24, 2020
I recently had an inquiry from a mother who is about to face a child custody trial in which a fan of Craig Childress is advising her opponent about “parental alienation”. This mother and others find it hard to figure out what Childress is talking about in his book “An Attachment-based Model of Parental Alienation”, published by a company that shares his office address. They are often especially concerned about Childress’s way of identifying “parental alienation” (PA) in children of divorce who want to avoid contact with one of their parents.
People have frequently asked me about Childress's diagnostic methods. What I am about to discuss is in his book "An Attachment-based Model of Parental Alienation", pp. 308-310.
Childress suggests that diagnosis should be done using an ABAB single-case protocol. This is a real thing. It is intended to help decide whether a particular treatment is helpful to a particular person. Here's what happens with the ABAB method:
Condition A is a set of circumstances that the client is experiencing. During these circumstances, observations are made of a concerning behavior. For example, a child is living with his mother and has no contact with father; behaviors showing hostility and rejection toward the father are recorded.
In Condition B, the client is placed in a different set of circumstances and the concerning behavior is again observed. For example, a treatment is started, and the child's rejection of the father is recorded.
Condition A is repeated and the concerning behavior is recorded. For example, the child is returned to the mother's custody and attitudes toward the father are again recorded.
Finally, Condition B is repeated.
If the concerning behavior (rejection of father) is less in condition B than in A, this is an indication that the treatment may be effective. Childress also concludes on p. 310 that if the treatment is effective, this is powerful evidence that the mother's pathogenic parenting is responsible for the child's behavior.
BUT! Here's where his claims fall apart.
1. When the ABAB protocol is used, Conditions A and B must be different only in one characteristic. If they are different in more than one way, it is impossible to know which factor might cause the difference. So, typically, ABAB might be used to test a treatment (Condition B) for bedwetting. The child stays at home and follows his ordinary habits, but sometimes receives the treatment and sometimes does not. Differences in bedwetting between A and B suggest that B is an effective treatment (although it could also be that the child just matured)....In Childress's method, however, there are many differences between A and B. B includes separation from the preferred parent, much contact with the nonpreferred parent, possibly different behavior from the nonpreferred[parent than occurred in the past, and four days of “High Road” treatment, which may include transportation by youth transport service workers. The child is frightened and has no idea what is happening. As most of these kids are not very young children, we can expect them to catch on to what they are supposed to do and to do it in order to avoid further unpleasant events. Whether behavior is different in A and B because of separation, because of treatment, because of fear, or whatever-- that cannot be told from this approach.
2. The ABAB approach could only be considered diagnostic if there were just one cause for the behavior, and just one treatment that was already well demonstrated to treat the problem effectively. This is not true of rejection of a parent, so whatever happens on ABAB, it does not show what caused the problem. With respect to the ABAB evidence showing what caused the rejection, Childress seems to envision only one way in which the behavior can be caused. Like other PA advocates, he has a single-factor theory that omits to consider any of a myriad causes of behavior and especially does not look into the rejected parent's own actions, whether abusive or simply awkward and lacking in parenting and communication skills. The ABAB protocol is a real set-up, as most children are likely to alter behavior as instructed when powerless in a strange situation; when they do so, Childress then points to this-- skipping a number of logical steps-- as empirical evidence of the diagnosis. (What he would conclude if the child did not change, I cannot guess, but it would probably be that the preferred parent has caused serious mental illness in the child!)
The ABAB protocol sounds most impressive to those who have never heard of it, but the way Childress uses it (if indeed he does—he does not seem to provide any examples of actually doing this) cannot demonstrate that a treatment works with a particular child. (It is not intended to, and cannot, show that a treatment is generally effective). The ABAB protocol, no matter how well implemented, cannot show the cause of a problem unless there is only one cause AND unless it has been demonstrated that the treatment is generally effective.
A long time ago, Dr. Spock wrote that if your child has a fever, you can sponge her with cool water and it helps as much as an alcohol rub, but “it doesn’t smell so important”. Childress’s ABAB protocol smells important to people who don’t understand it, but in fact the odor you detect is not alcohol.
Tuesday, December 17, 2019
In the last several months I’ve had several emails from an outfit called Forbrain™. These emails give purely anecdotal evidence for the use of some devices that are supposed to treat a variety of childhood problems such as motor and balance difficulties, autism, sensory processing disorders, and ADD/ADHD. As these problems probably have different causes and certainly have different trajectories, it seems unlikely that one form of treatment can help all of them, but who knows? I would not care to swear that it can’t, without further evidence.
However, neither would I swear that it can help without further evidence. One email I received stated that there were “scientific studies” supporting this view, but when I clicked on the link I got a warning so I didn’t go any further. The email described the case of a child named Josephine who was said to have had her speech and general conduct much improved by use of Forbrain™ technology and even stopped having frequent tantrums. This is very nice,(although obviously it can’t be checked, nor could we know whether Josephine would have started doing better even without this treatment. Nothing here seems to be providing the kind of information that consumers should demand before they commit to a treatment for children.
Forbrain™ apparently involves the wearing of a headset that provides conduction of sounds through bones into the inner ear, rather than stimulation of the inner ear in the usual way by the passage of sound waves through air in the auditory canal, followed by movement of the eardrum, etc. The Forbrain™ device also filters some sounds and is said to allow practice on the “audio-vocal loop". A second device advertised by the Forbrain™ advocates is called Soundsory ®; this one uses “specially designed music processed with neuro-acoustic modifications as well as a series of movement-based exercises” and is intended to “establish good foundations, from the fundamentals of sensory integration to more complex cognitive functions”.
Listening to special music? Being exposed to certain kinds of sound patterns? It’s all rather familiar—and the name Tomatis springs to mind. Yes, an Internet search shows Tomatis therapy , Forbrain ™ and Soundsory® on the same page. It would appear that there is no systematic evidence to support any of these practices.
What should consumers ask for before they commit to the trouble and expense of methods like these? Anecdotes are not good enough. It may be that Josephine’s condition did improve—but would this necessarily be true for any other child? Was Josephine’s improvement caused by Forbrain™? Might it have happened anyway? Or could it even have been that she would have improved more without Forbrain™? These questions can’t be answered by even the most touching story, but touching stories are likely to make us forget to ask the right questions.
For adequate demonstration that either Forbrain™ or Soundsory® technology are useful for any of the problems mentioned earlier, we need the following: A large group of children who share a problem that can be evaluated and quantified. These children are to be divided into two groups (treatment and comparison) with equivalent age ranges, gender proportions, and severity of problems. Assignment to groups is done by staff who do not have information that identifies individuals. Treatment is done by staff who do not know which group each child belongs to. One [treatment] group is given the treatment recommended by Forbrain™ advocates. The other [comparison] group receives a “sham” program—they wear headsets for the same amounts of time as the treatment group but hear different things. At the end of the treatment period, all children are re-evaluated by staff members who do not know which group a child was in. Finally, changes seen in the treatment children are compared to changes seen in the comparison children. If the changes seen in the treatment children are positive, and are statistically greater than those in the comparison group, then advocates of Forbrain™ and Soundsory® can say that they have evidence that their treatments are effective.
Until this happens, caveat emptor!
Wednesday, December 11, 2019
I hear from concerned people in the Netherlands that a new issue about “parental alienation” (PA) has arisen. Not only are some divorced parents accused of “alienating” children who do not want to have contact with the other parent, even though many factors other than alienating behavior are likely to be responsible for the children’s attitudes, and not only is notional PA argued to be a reason for prohibiting contact between children and their preferred parents. Now, in addition, it has been proposed that policemen can be trained to identify PA cases!
Let’s examine this proposal under a strong light.
The first question we need to ask is a simple but critical one: can anyone identify PA? Is there any established, evidence-based protocol that can be used to differentiate PA cases from other cases in which children’s refusal can be based on a range of causes, from domestic violence and abuse to dislike of a step-parent or step-sibling to situations where contact with one parent interferes with sports or friendships?
No, there is no such method. Identification of PA cases is a subjective process based on the opinions of PA proponents. In no case does such identification involve observation or even corollary evidence for alienating behavior by preferred parents. In a few cases known to me, the PA identification did not even consider whether a child had refused contact. In one I can think of, a girl actually asked to have contact with her father and he refused on the ground that she would accuse him of molesting her if he saw her; he stated that he planned to send her to boarding school if he got custody. In another case, a 17-year-old who had for years been alternating weeks at her mother’s and father’s houses said she needed more stability and wanted to have a “home” at her mother’s house while continuing to visit her father, and this was alleged to be a PA case.
Interestingly, Richard Warshak, a long-term proponent of PA and supporter of the Family Bridges treatment, has written of his concerns about false positive identifications of PA and about the need to discriminate between PA and other causes of contact refusal. He appears to recognize that children have been identified as PA cases when in fact they were not. (Although Warshak did not express concern about this point, the consequences of PA identification can include custody change and prohibition of contact with the preferred parent as well as court orders for that parent to pay extravagant fees for PA treatment. As PA proponents also argue that PA is child abuse, such parents are in danger of being affected personally and professionally when mistakenly identified as abusers.) However, Warshak did not mention false negative cases in which PA was not identified even though it was present. I assume that this means that he feels all PA cases—and then some—are being identified, and that only one kind of mistake is being made: the mistake that has the most obvious and serious bad consequences for the child and the preferred parent.
So it seems that nobody can clearly identify PA in a way that would allow others to confirm the identification. On the contrary, people are concluding that PA is present when even its proponents admit that this may not be correct. Among the undesirable consequences of this situation are possibilities that a child’s custody may be given to a genuinely abusive parent—and research has already indicated that this has happened.
Let’s get back to these policemen in the Netherlands. Can they be trained to assess PA? Well, it’s possible that they could, IF anyone else was able to make this assessment. As there is no one who can identify PA validly and reliably, with some known proportion of false positives and false negatives, it would appear that we have nobody to train the policemen. You can’t teach what you don’t know.
One more point: when child custody evaluations are done, they are supposed to include information from corollary sources. What do neighbors, teachers, grandparents, family friends think about the parents and children? Has domestic violence formed part of the background for the child’s refusal? Gathering this kind of information takes time and expertise. No doubt policemen could be trained to do this, but it hardly seems like their job. Of course, PA proponents are not doing this kind of investigation either, even though it should be part of their job.
Perhaps the conclusion here should be that policemen are just as capable as PA proponents of identifying PA: in other words, not particularly capable at all, and possibly not particularly interested in doing the job as they should.
I have been neglecting this blog so badly, because a lot of my time in the last six months has been taken up by writing and talking about “parental alienation” (PA) and I don’t suppose anyone wants to read about that every day. But a few days ago someone asked me a question about a non-PA issue and I think it’s one that may be of interest to a number of people.
My correspondent is a lawyer who works with an anti-child-abuse non-profit organization. She wrote to me to ask if I could recommend a psychologist who could diagnose a type of factitious disorder or “Munchausen’s by proxy”. These terms are used to describe cases in which an adult, usually a parent and often the mother, asks for medical treatment for her child but secretly does things that would cause the child to seem to need treatment. For example, the adult might substitute something else for the child’s urine for a urinalysis, or more seriously-- and this has been videorecorded—partially suffocate the child and then call for help because the child has stopped breathing. These cases are obviously to be taken very seriously. What if the child actually is sick but no treatment is provided because it’s mistakenly thought that the parent is causing the symptoms? What if the parent is causing the symptoms, this is not recognized, and the child dies because of the parent’s actions? It’s no wonder that there is much concern when such a situation is suspected.
Here is the story my lawyer-correspondent gave me. (Readers with infant mental health background will quickly see why I am bringing this up.) A woman of 40, who had a 5-year-old child, began to make frequent emergency room visits when her second child was about 2 months old. When I say frequent: she took the baby in on 27 of 30 possible days. No medical problems were detected. A neighbor reported that she had come into the house to find the baby turning blue and had restored the airway; as far as I know, she did not see the mother causing this episode.
Medical personnel were worried about this situation and suspected factitious disorder. They moved to have the baby placed in foster care and the mother has for at least a month had only supervised visitation. A forensic psychologist, who may or may not have any infant mental health training is to evaluate the mother. My lawyer-correspondent was concerned about the extent of the evaluation, and that was why she asked me to recommend an evaluator.
My response was that everyone was ignoring the most obvious explanation of the mother’s behavior: a perinatal mood disorder (PMD). PMD, sometimes called post-partum depression, is a state of anxiety and depression that sometimes occurs during pregnancy and/or after childbirth. Mothers with PMD may feel incapable of caring for the children and sometimes focus on the idea that there is something terribly wrong with a baby. By far the largest number of comments and queries I have had on this blog have come from mothers who were tortured by their beliefs that their babies were somehow damaged; many of the mothers were convinced that a baby of a few weeks of age might be autistic. When I answered these queries I usually recommended that the mothers see their ob-gyns for PMD evaluation and receive the treatment they needed, because the problem was in their own conditions, not in the babies. Many of them subsequently wrote and said that they had done this and had been helped a great deal.
PMDs have been known for quite a long time to be identifiable and treatable. They are no one’s fault and although the mothers often blame themselves, the rest of us should not blame or punish them. About 15 years ago, several states had innovative programs to educate people about PMD. New Jersey, for example, had a program called “Speak Up When You’re Down” that was sponsored very effectively by the wife of the then-governor. (I was at that time part of the train-the-trainer program for that program.) Regrettably, political forces cancelled funding for these programs and it appears that we are back where we started on this issue.
Ob-gyn offices should be making regular use of a screening instrument for PMD, the Edinburgh Depression Scale. This is quick and easy to use and identifies women who may benefit from treatment for PMD. In addition, I would argue that its use with every new mother benefits everyone, not just those with mood problems, as it reminds everyone of the potential for PMD in themselves and others. This is especially important as PMD symptoms may not occur until later in the first year after childbirth, and women who were screened early may realize later that new symptoms they experience are related to what they were asked on the screening instrument. In the case brought up by my lawyer-correspondent, the mother had apparently not been assessed for PMD, and candidly I remain unsure whether this is happening at this point, although I suggested some possible resources in addition to her ob-gyn.
I want to take a moment to talk about the experience of the mother in this case. I’m basing my comments on the assumption that PMD is at work here—I do not have enough details to know this, of course. The mother’s anxiety about her baby, expressed by multiple ER visits, has not been understood as an expression of her disordered mood, but instead has been interpreted as highly abnormal maternal behavior that is a danger to the baby. The obvious solution from that viewpoint is to put the baby in foster care. But what if the mother’s behavior is symptomatic of PMD and is thus both identifiable and treatable, but neither identified nor treated? In that case, the mother’s experience is of validation of her abnormal mood. Yes, we say to her, you are right to be anxious and depressed and feel that something is wrong, and we are taking your baby away because something is so wrong with you that you cannot be helped.
The mother now sees the baby only under supervision, and it is no longer “her baby”. The constant tiny maturational changes of the early months go by between visits without the mother having any chance to learn from them, and the baby at each visit is a somewhat different person than the mother saw the last time. Her behavior toward the baby is bound to be out of synch for exactly that reason, so she will be observed on each visit to be awkward and uncertain with the baby and not to behave like a “normal mother”. This kind of experience adds to her sense of anxiety and sadness, which apparently is not being treated by appropriate medication and talk therapy. Who will step in to help this family? When will anyone do anything to support the mother in her fight with PMD and to facilitate her relationship with her baby? Or is the solution seen to be indefinite foster care, even termination of parental rights?
N.B. I should point out that there is a severe form of perinatal mood disorder, sometimes called post-partum psychosis, and some readers will recall the tragic case of Andrea Yates, who killed all her children after repeated post-partum problems that were ignored by the children’s father. But these horrible cases are very unusual, and most cases of PMD, when identified, can be treated quite effectively.